Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Cardinal/Hayward/Jones, Xenocrates and H.H. Price

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20 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Xenocrates held that the soul had no form or substance, but was number [Xenocrates, by Cicero]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Before we can abstract from an instance of violet, we must first recognise it [Price,HH]
There may be degrees of abstraction which allow recognition by signs, without full concepts [Price,HH]
If judgement of a characteristic is possible, that part of abstraction must be complete [Price,HH]
There is pre-verbal sign-based abstraction, as when ice actually looks cold [Price,HH]
Intelligent behaviour, even in animals, has something abstract about it [Price,HH]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Recognition must precede the acquisition of basic concepts, so it is the fundamental intellectual process [Price,HH]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
We reach concepts by clarification, or by definition, or by habitual experience [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Abstractions can be interpreted dispositionally, as the ability to recognise or imagine an item [Price,HH]
If ideas have to be images, then abstract ideas become a paradoxical problem [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Our understanding of 'dog' or 'house' arises from a repeated experience of concomitances [Price,HH]
The basic concepts of conceptual cognition are acquired by direct abstraction from instances [Price,HH]
A 'felt familiarity' with universals is more primitive than abstraction [Price,HH]